Gaps and Wins – Assessing the Response

In our previous articles, we examined the initial response to displaced Ukrainians and the services established to support them. Now, we shift our focus to assessing how effectively these measures have worked in practice, along with the broader federal, provincial, and community responses. 

One of the biggest limitations of the Canada-Ukraine Authorization for Emergency Travel (CUAET) is that it was designed as a temporary measure, allowing displaced Ukrainians to enter Canada with temporary worker status (IRCC, 2024). The framework was built on the expectation that they would return home once it was safe. However, with the war now in its third year and no clear resolution in sight, this approach has proven inadequate.  

For many Ukrainians, the decision to leave was not just about temporary safety but about building a new life. Post-arrival survey data published by Operation Ukrainian Safe Haven (OUSH) reveal that only 1.4% of respondents plan to return to Ukraine (Ukraine Safe Haven, 2023). This suggests that a significant portion of CUAET holders came with long-term resettlement in mind – something the program itself did not fully anticipate or accommodate.  

Unlike Canada’s refugee and humanitarian resettlement programs, CUAET does not provide a clear pathway to permanent residency. The support mechanisms available to CUAET holders were built on a temporary residence model and designed as short-term, exceptional measures rather than long-term solutions. As a result, Ukrainian evacuees have been left to navigate Canada’s complex immigration system on their own, competing for highly demanding pathways to permanent residency with limited quotas that fail to meet the growing demand. This further highlights the program’s fundamental shortcomings when viewed from a long-term perspective. 

The federal government’s financial and housing mechanisms, introduced as temporary emergency measures, could only address the immediate basic needs of newly arrived Ukrainians and were largely one-time in nature. These included: 

• Short-term housing: Our feedback survey with Settlement Service Providers (SPOs) in Alberta ¹, indicated that the temporary hotel accommodation model used by Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), which provided up to 14 nights of shelter for incoming Ukrainians, was insufficient. The additional funding allocated by the province to supplement the IRCC model and expand it to more cities helped bridge the gap by offering Ukrainians more options for accommodation and an additional 14 days of stay. However, this extension still did not provide newcomers with enough time to secure long-term housing, obtain necessary documentation, find employment, and settle into their new environment. Many families reported struggling to find affordable housing within the timeframe, especially in cities with high rental costs and limited vacancies. 

• One-time financial Aid: Since there were no long-term financial benefits available while Ukrainian newcomers searched for work, many relied entirely on the one-time financial assistance provided by the Government of Canada. In reality, this support could only cover the first month’s rent and a deposit. For those who arrived without savings, the pressure of handling urgent settlement needs within such a short timeframe caused extreme stress and anxiety, as they struggled to avoid homelessness. Even with the introduction of a financial benefits program specifically for displaced Ukrainians by the province, it was not sufficient to meet basic needs on its own. Moreover, it is now only accessible to certain Ukrainians facing significant barriers to employment, leaving many ineligible while having no savings or income to survive. 

However, one of the more sustained support measures introduced under CUAET – which sets it apart from other temporary programs – is that, despite being open work permit holders (who are typically ineligible for IRCC-funded services), CUAET holders were granted access to the same settlement supports available to permanent residents through an amended IRCC policy. 

Language training and employment support programs were among the most popular settlement services, according to the OUSH post-arrival survey (Ukraine Safe Haven, 2023). However, despite open access to these services, capacity was severely limited, making it difficult to accommodate everyone. Many programs had long waitlists, sometimes stretching for months. For example, as of June 2023, the waiting period for a language assessment in Calgary exceeded 55 business days, while the wait to be placed in a class was approximately six months (AAISA, 2024). Similar bottlenecks were reported in employment and other settlement services, where job-finding assistance, orientation services, and credential recognition programs were overwhelmed by demand. 

While the province played a role in supplementing federal support, the unprecedented number of Ukrainian arrivals in Alberta and across Canada exceeded the sector’s capacity to meet the rapidly growing demand for services. Adding to this strain, the secondary migration of Ukrainian newcomers to Alberta has become a consistent trend. Due to limited mechanisms for tracking secondary migration, the true impact on Alberta remains hard to assess ² . Survey feedback from AAISA’s SPOs, as well as Alberta Health Services’ health registration applications, consistently highlight a trend of new arrivals moving to Alberta even after the official closure of the CUAET program, providing evidence of continued secondary migration waves. 

Alberta is widely perceived as a more affordable province in terms of housing, career opportunities, and its strong Ukrainian community presence – both on social media and through official channels. As a result, the province continues to experience additional influxes of Ukrainian newcomers, some of whom may not be fully captured in official records. 

Overall, Alberta’s already strained housing market, as well as its overwhelmed employment and language services, are continuing to face persistent backlogs, struggling to meet the needs of the growing Ukrainian newcomer population. 

Aside from lacking a consistent support system, the CUAET program also fails to provide adequate assistance for those unable to work. As temporary residents with worker status on paper, Ukrainian evacuees are expected to support themselves. In reality, many face systemic obstacles: 

• Work limitations for study permit holders: Those granted study permits face similar challenges to temporary foreign workers in Canada. While K-12 education ³ is free, transitioning to post-secondary education requires paying international tuition fees, which are significantly higher than domestic rates. Even affording domestic tuition is often unfeasible, as study permits limit the number of hours students can work (IRCC 2025). Moreover, most school-aged children depend on their families’ financial stability, making it even more difficult to pursue post-secondary education. As a result, many find themselves in a situation where they are unable to study or work in Canada. 

• Barriers for those unable to work: The most affected groups include elderly individuals, single mothers with children, and people with disabilities. Support mechanisms under CUAET for these populations remain extremely limited. Since the system was not designed to meet their needs from the outset, they have been placed in an especially vulnerable position. Some community organizations have stepped in to provide housing, food, and donations, but these efforts have been inconsistent and largely reliant on volunteer support.

This reality has meant that without a stable income, many individuals simply cannot afford to stay in Canada – a stark contrast to many European countries, where housing and monthly financial assistance have been provided in various forms to meet basic needs (MPI Europe & IOM, 2025).  

To summarize, the CUAET program was a pilot framework designed as an emergency response using the temporary resident model. Since it allowed Ukrainians to apply for a temporary resident visa abroad for free – and given the massive displacement of Ukrainians seeking shelter – the program generated unprecedented interest, leading to a high volume of applications and arrivals in Canada. 

As a result, IRCC had to introduce additional support mechanisms to supplement the temporary residence model. This created an interesting hybrid framework that offered some extra support, but it was largely short-term and unable to fully accommodate the scale of arrivals. 

For Ukrainians who arrived with strong English skills, savings, and relevant job experience, the program provided a solid foundation to integrate quickly and establish stability in Canada. However, for those unable to work due to language barriers, employment challenges, or health concerns, survival has remained a struggle. Even with access to some provincial and federal support programs, self-sufficiency has been nearly impossible. In cases where individuals could manage with help from family, host families, community networks, or volunteers, there have been no clear pathways for them to stay permanently. This has left many in a precarious situation – forced to survive without long-term security, despite having nowhere to return to. 

With IRCC settlement support access ending on March 31, 2025, the question remains: What happens next? In our final article, we will assess the near future for CUAET holders, examining their available options and what service providers can do to continue supporting them. 

 Footnotes

References 

1. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC). (2024). Rapid Evaluation of the Ukraine Response. https://publications.gc.ca/site/archivee-archived.html?url=https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2024/ircc/Ci4-254-2024-eng.pdf
2. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC). (2025). Work off campus as an international student. https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/study-canada/work/work-off-campus.html 
3. Ukraine Safe Haven. (2023). Post-arrival Survey Report. https://ukrainesafehaven.ca/data/post-arrival-survey/  
4. Migration Policy Institute Europe (MPI Europe) & International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2025). Exploring refugees’ intentions to return to Ukraine. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/mpie-iom_ukraine-return-intentions-2024-final.pdf  
5. Alberta Association of Immigrant Serving Agencies (AAISA). (2024). Examining Canada’s immigration measures for supporting war-affected Ukrainians: A case study of Alberta’s response and lessons learned. https://aaisa.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/CUAET_Report_AAISA_EN.pdf 
6. Alberta Association of Immigrant Serving Agencies (AAISA). (2025). Secondary migration report: Beyond borders – Understanding newcomer mobility in Canada. https://aaisa.ca/secondary-migration-report-beyond-borders-understanding-newcomer-mobility-in-canada/